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BREAKING THE STALEMATE:  THE 
JUDICIARY’S CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE IN 
DISPUTES OVER THE WAR POWERS 
R. Andrew Smith∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Historically, the goal of the three-part American government 
structure is to separate and balance the power to govern.1  Separation 
prevents any branch of the government from straying from its intended 
purpose and in turn, fosters democratic values as a result.2  Ideally, this 
prevents one branch of government from over-exercising its power over 
the others.  However, language in the Constitution gives little guidance 
on when one branch of the government may be acting outside the sphere 
of its authority.  Constitutional ambiguities and overlapping powers 
result in struggles between different arms of the government.  The 
purpose of this Article is to explore the role of the judiciary in mediating 
the power struggles between the legislative and executive branches of 
government.  Justiciability restrictions, such as the political question 
doctrine, can make the Court’s role in such disputes unclear.  Recently, 
the disclosure of President Bush’s warrantless electronic surveillance 
program3 and subsequent lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the 
program4 have thrown these intra-governmental tensions into sharp 
relief by questioning the breadth of the executive war power5 juxtaposed 
to the legislative war power.6  In this Article, President Bush’s 
warrantless domestic surveillance program provides a focal point for 
analysis of separation of powers in general and the problem of 
overlapping constitutional grants of authority.   
                                                 
∗  R. Andrew Smith graduated from the Valparaiso University School of Law in 2006, 
and is licensed to practice in the state of Illinois.  At the time of publication, he worked for 
the City of Chicago Law Department in the Municipal Prosecution Division.  He would like 
to thank the Valparaiso University Law Review, Brenda Likavec for the opportunity, Professor 
JoEllen Lind for her assistance in developing the concept for this article and for her 
continual guidance, and his family and close friends for all of the support they provided 
that helped make this possible. 
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 300-03 (James Madison) (Bantam Classic 2003). 
2 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 314-17. 
3 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 16, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WL 20281359. 
4 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
5 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
6 Id. at art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11-16. 
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II.  THE STALEMATE PROBLEM 
The Constitution reflects James Madison’s concept of multifaceted 
government.7  However, the powers annunciated in Article II fail to 
clearly define the powers of the executive branch.8  The division of 
power between the three branches, the ambiguous nature of power 
provided to the president, and the Supreme Court’s use of the political 
question doctrine ultimately create an impasse between the three 
branches and their constitutionally delegated power.   
A. The Separation of Powers 
The purpose of separating governmental function is to prevent a 
tyrannical majority from coming to power.9  A reasonable construction of 
the Constitution requires keeping the three branches separate “in all 
cases in which they were not expressly blended.”10  However, the 
constitutional text itself blends some governmental activities.  These 
intersections of power between the branches operate to curb the 
unilateral control of any one branch over the others and supports the 
notion of “checks and balances,” which works in conjunction with the 
separation of powers.11  However, the Constitution should not be 
interpreted to blend the operation of the branches more than its text 
requires12 because such an interpretation would allow one branch to 
usurp the power of another branch subverting the liberty interests that 
undergird the structure.  This structure prevents Congress from 
removing or including itself in the exercise of another branch’s power.13   
The Supreme Court has used the separation of powers to invalidate 
legislation that permitted Congress to invade the president’s 
                                                 
7 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 58 (1998).  
Wood articulates that the structure of the government operates to cultivate independent 
liberty, aiming to minimize government officials’ tendencies toward self-interested 
corruption.  Id.; see also Jeffrey Rudd, Restructuring America’s Government to Create 
Sustainable Development, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 371, 415 (2006). 
8 U.S. CONST. art. II. 
9 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1. 
10 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926).  In Myers, the Court considered an act 
of Congress proscribing the ability of the president to discharge the Postmaster General.  Id.  
In invalidating the statute, the Court concluded that Congress cannot annex power 
attributed to other branches of government unless the Constitution expressly authorizes 
the mix of governmental power between multiple branches of the government.  See id. at 
163-65. 
11 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 295. 
12 Id. 
13 Myers, 272 U.S. at 159-60. 
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appointment power,14 define the extent to which Congress may create 
rules of procedure for the courts,15 preserve the finality of judicial 
determinations,16 and limit the exercise of judicial power.17  In many 
ways, the separation of powers doctrine has been used to preserve the 
power attributed to the judiciary in the Constitution.18  However, these 
examples also illustrate an operational problem within the doctrine.   
                                                 
14 Id. at 52. 
15 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (holding that the federal 
sentencing guidelines were not a violation of the separation of powers).  But see United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  In Booker, the Court invalidated the two provisions of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that required the courts to apply the guidelines in every 
criminal case.  Id.  Invalidating the mandatory aspects of the guidelines effectively reset the 
boundary of legislative restrictions on the operation of federal courts.  Id. at 250-53.  This is 
not entirely inconsistent with existing law.  For example, in United States v. Union Pacific 
Rail Company, the Supreme Court considered the extent of Congress’s ability to alter 
definitions of “troops” to take advantage of the Land Grant Acts.  249 U.S. 354 (1919).  The 
Land Grant Acts generally provided that the government could move its property and 
troops over the roads and rails free of charge or at a reduced cost.  Id. at 355-56.  Ultimately, 
the Court held that the legislature could not expand the meaning of “troops” to include 
individuals not rightly classified as members of the military in order to take advantage of 
the free use provisions of the Land Use Acts.  Id. at 358-61.  Like Booker, the Union Pacific 
case prevents Congress from expanding its ability to redefine what constitutes members of 
the military and reserves the power to determine where costs apply to the Comptroller of 
the Treasury and the lead administrators of the military, all of whom are agents of the 
executive branch. 
16 See Ala. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 U.S. 461, 512 (2004) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).  The Court considered whether the Environmental Protection 
Agency has the power to block the construction of diesel generators permitted by the 
Alaskan Department of Environmental Conservation because the product of the 
construction would violate the Clean Air Act.  Id. at 468.  The majority ultimately 
determined that the EPA had the ability to issue the order to cease the construction 
notwithstanding the state permit.  Id.  Justice Kennedy’s dissent points out the error in this 
ruling by noting the fundamental conflict between rulings by executive agencies and the 
operation of Article III courts.  Kennedy specifically stated that the legislative and 
executive branches may not revise the decisions of Article III courts making the decisions 
final and binding.  Id. at 512 (citing Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409, 2 Dallas 409, 410, 1 L. Ed. 
436 (1792); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995)). 
17 There are numerous cases using the separation of powers doctrine to render an issue 
before the court non-cognizable.  See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002).  In 
Harbury, the Court considered a challenge to government limitations on information under 
the auspice of international relations in the murder of a Guatemalan citizen.  Id. at 405.  The 
Court refused to address the issue, citing separation of powers concerns as part of its 
reason for finding the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  
Id. at 416. 
18 See generally In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945) (holding that Congress may not execute 
legislation which limits the power of the courts to issue contempt citations). 
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Though the purpose of delineating governmental powers aims to 
preserve the people’s liberty interest,19 the Supreme Court has observed 
that the perfect operation of this concept is largely theoretical and 
unattainable in practice.20  In Federalist No. 48, James Madison explicitly 
stated that a strict practical application of separate powers is 
pragmatically impossible.21  Rather, the doctrine should operate in a way 
that would prevent one branch from invading the powers of another.22  
Madison’s own conclusion at the end of Federalist No. 48 notes that the 
mere demarcation of government structure on paper is insufficient to 
guard against government tyranny.23   
The operation of the judiciary in this scheme is summed up in 
Federalist No. 78, where Alexander Hamilton stated that the separated 
powers will allow the judiciary to keep the legislature “within the limits 
assigned to their authority.”24  Somewhere between the theoretical 
underpinnings of the doctrine and its practical application rests a 
momentary vacuum of government power.  Ideally, the doctrine of the 
separation of powers operates to prevent this power gap by permitting 
the judiciary to interpret and define the divisions of power.   
But unfortunately, the language of the Constitution is not always 
clear.  The overlapping powers attributed to the president in Article II 
and to the legislature in Article I exemplify this ambiguity.  These mixed 
responsibilities create problems of constitutional interpretation and blur 
the operation of the separate powers.   
B. The Shared War Power 
The War power is a primary example of the conflicts that arise when 
the Constitution grants dual powers to two branches of government.  For 
instance, the president retains the power to direct the armed forces, but 
Congress has the ability to restrain the president’s power to act as the 
Commander in Chief.  It is important to parse out the distinct powers of 
each branch before analyzing the tension between them. 
                                                 
19 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1; FEDERALIST NO. 51 
(James Madison), supra note 1. 
20 Brush v. Ware, 40 U.S. 93, 99 (1841). 
21 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 300. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 303. 
24 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 472. 
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1. The Executive Branch 
The language in the Constitution describing the powers of the 
executive branch and the legislative branch limit each arm of the 
government in different ways.25  The only clear power possessed by the 
executive is the power to execute federal laws; the structure of the 
Constitution itself demonstrates this narrow construction of executive 
power.26  However, Article II also includes other powers inherent only to 
the president, indicating that the executive power is greater than just the 
execution of the law.27  While the president lacks the fundamental 
lawmaking power of Congress, this does not prevent the president from 
affecting citizen’s rights.28  For example, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the president’s power as Commander in Chief to include his 
ability to detain citizens and non-citizens to ensure national security.29  
Similarly, current domestic surveillance programs directly implicate the 
Fourth Amendment30 by subjecting citizens to searches without 
warrants.31  The expansiveness of the language used by the framers also 
seemingly expands the breadth of executive powers because the power 
                                                 
25 Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 46. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 46-48. 
28 Id. at 47-48. 
29 See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that an American citizen 
detained as an enemy combatant has a due process right to establish a factual basis for his 
or her detention but not foreclosing the president’s power to detain a citizen in the name of 
national security as an enemy combatant); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (concluding 
that alien citizens detained as enemy combatants retain a due process right under a writ of 
habeas corpus and the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment).  The power here is 
simply to detain, not detain indefinitely; however, the power to limit individual liberty 
remains a significant infringement of otherwise constitutionally guaranteed rights. 
30 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Id. 
31 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 3, at A1.  This article first appeared in The New York 
Times on December 16, 2005.  The authors discuss the details of a program instituted by 
President Bush after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack in New York City.  The 
program, later dubbed the Terrorist Surveillance Program, collected information through 
telephone wire-taps of United States citizens without providing the protections of search 
warrants.  See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. 
Mich. 2006).  This has not been the only time the President has authorized a surveillance 
program; he has also permitted the CIA and the NSA to collect transaction records for bank 
transfers between American citizens and suspected Al Qaeda members or supporters.  
James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bank Data Is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block Terror, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 23, 2006, at A1. 
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of the Commander in Chief is not explicitly defined in Article II.32  By 
contrast, the Constitution explicitly attributes different powers to the 
legislative branch.   
2. The Legislative Branch 
Article I, section eight of the Constitution provides a list of explicit 
powers conferred upon Congress.33  Compared to the other provisions of 
the Constitution, Article II provides Congress with the most expansive 
power to act.34  In Federalist No. 48, James Madison noted that the 
legislature retains superiority in the government because its powers are 
more extensive and less susceptible to limitations placed on the other 
branches.35  Moreover, Congress is the only part of the government with 
specific power to collect money from the public.36  However, legislative 
power still has its constitutional limits.   
Historically, the Supreme Court has set the boundaries of 
congressional power under Article I.  In McCulloch v. Maryland,  the 
Court broadly defined Congress’s legislative authority.37  Under the 
“Necessary and Proper” clause,38 the legislature retains the power to 
create laws that allow the execution of constitutionally prescribed 
duties.39  However, these powers are not absolute.  The legislature does 
not enjoy an unfettered ability to dictate policies on foreign affairs.40  
                                                 
32 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
33 Id. at art. I, § 8. 
34 See generally id. art I, § 8 (identifying legislative power); id. at art. II, § 2, cls. 1-2 
(identifying executive power); id. at art. III, § 1, § 3, cl. 2 (identifying judicial power).  
Article I, section eight provides the Congress with eighteen explicit powers, while Article 
II, section two, provides the executive with five explicit powers.  id. at art I, § 8; id. at art II, 
§ 2.  Article III, section one, states the predominant judiciary’s power to judge, but these 
powers are more narrowly defined by the remainder of Article III, which limits the scope of 
judicial jurisdiction.  Id. at art. III. 
35 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 302. 
36 Id.  The specific language demonstrates that “the legislative department alone has 
access to the pockets of the people” means Congress is the only branch with the power to 
lay taxes on the people. 
37 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).  The Supreme Court determined the breadth of 
Congressional power by finding that the necessary and proper clause permitted Congress 
to create a Bank of the United States under Congress’s authority to create currency.  Id. at 
324. 
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
39 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 325. 
40 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003).  The Court noted specifically 
that Congress does not retain total control over foreign affairs by stating that the president 
has independent authority to act.  Id.  However, this does not prevent Congress from 
regulating public and private dealings with other countries.  Id.  Interestingly, the Court’s 
decision in Garamendi may have significantly limited the ability of Congress to create policy 
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Similarly, Congress does not retain the ability to legislate beyond the 
scope of the powers defined within Article I.41  Congress may not act in 
ways that would usurp the power of the other branches such as the 
judiciary.42  But even with these limits, the Constitution permits the 
legislature to enact laws that would control the actions of the judiciary 
and the executive.43   
While Article II and Article III of the Constitution designate specific 
powers to the president and judiciary, these provisions also provide 
Congress with authority to oversee the actions of these branches.44  This 
structure leads to situations where the president can act in a manner 
inconsistent with an act of Congress.  One current area of this kind of 
conflict involves the war powers possessed by the legislative and 
executive branches.   
3. The Inherent Conflict in the War Powers 
The text of Article II states that the president acts as the Commander 
in Chief of the Army, Navy, and the Militia of the several states.45  
                                                                                                             
in foreign affairs by providing greater latitude to the president in issuing this policy 
through the State Department.  See Note, Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Regulation of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1877, 1898 (2006). 
41 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  In Lopez, the Court determined that 
Congress acted outside its ability to regulate interstate commerce by making a law 
preventing people from carrying guns within a school zone.  Id.  This particular law 
reached past the breadth of the commerce clause, and affected an area within the control of 
state law.  Id. at 561 n.3. 
42 See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965).  In Brown, the Court considered 
whether an act of the California legislature prohibiting members of the Communist party 
from serving as elected officials in labor unions violated the constitutional prohibition 
against bills of attainder.  Id.  In determining that the act violated the constitutional 
prohibition of bills of attainder, the Court concluded that the prohibition works to 
implement the separation of powers and prevent a trial by the legislature.  Id. 
43 Examples of these laws for the executive branch are the War Powers Resolution, 50 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1541-1548 (West 2003), and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 
Pub. L. No. 95-11, 92 Stat. 1796 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1863 
(West 2003 & Supp. 2006)), both discussed in more detail later.  Examples for the judiciary 
include the Judiciary Act of 1888 which established the jurisdiction of the federal circuit 
courts of appeals and regulated the removal of cases from state courts.  Act of Aug. 13, 
1888, 50 Cong. ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433. 
44 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring the Senate give consent by two-thirds majority 
to ratify any international treaty, and provide advice and consent in matters of executive 
appointments to governmental offices like ambassadors and appointments to the United 
States Supreme Court); id. at art. III, § 2, cls. 2-3 (providing Congress with the power to 
create laws setting the jurisdiction of the federal courts, to create lower courts, and 
determine the punishment for the crime of treason). 
45 Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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However, the only provision in the Constitution using the word “war” is 
in the definition of legislative war power.46  A reading of the 
Constitution may generally indicate that the president’s war power only 
activates when Congress issues a declaration of war; however, the 
president has used military force under both declarations of war and 
congressional resolutions authorizing military action.47   
Since World War II, the build-up of a standing army has altered the 
balance of war power between Congress and the president, abdicating 
Congress’s responsibility and shifting it to the president.48  However, 
because of Congress’s ability to appropriate funds to support the 
military, it alone retains the power to determine the number of soldiers 
that make up the American military forces.49  Congress may also create 
laws that regulate the administration of the military.50   
This places Congress in the unique position of being able to reign in 
the military activities of the executive by creating laws dictating 
procedure that the president must follow in exercising his power as 
Commander and Chief.  The War Powers Resolution of 1973 is a prime 
example of Congress exercising this constitutional power. 51  It served to 
prevent the president from relying on military appropriations bills as 
authorizations for the use of military force.52  The impetus for the 
resolution was largely Congress’s unwillingness to continue to fund 
military actions in Vietnam.53  However, the War Powers Resolution is 
not without its practical flaws; it is possible that the president could 
circumvent the Resolution by interpreting the exceptions for exigent 
                                                 
46 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 11.  Congress has the power “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”  Id. 
47 John Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War 
Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 176 (1996).  John Yoo’s article also notes that historically, the 
legislature has only issued five declarations of war, and has favored issuing other 
resolutions, or statutory provisions, which provide the president with the power to direct 
the military into action.  Id.  In some situations, like the Korean War, Congress failed to 
issue either a declaration of war, or a resolution providing authorization for the use of 
military force.  Id. 
48 See also JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 47-67 (Princeton Univ. Press 1993).  
See generally LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING (Texas 
A&M Univ. Press 2000). 
49 Note, Recapturing the War Power, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1816 (2006) [hereinafter War 
Power]. 
50 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
51 Id. 
52 War Power, supra note 49, at 1820-21. 
53 Id. 
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circumstances to his benefit.54  One practical alternative to this structure 
is for Congress to restrict military appropriations by limiting the funding 
and the duration of these subsidies.55  Ultimately, the problem comes 
down to whether the president has the ability to interpret acts of 
Congress such as the War Powers Resolution and respond with military 
force when alleged exigent circumstances arise.   
Congress retains the power to enact laws restricting the power of the 
executive as Commander in Chief, while the president retains the power 
to defend the nation with military force when he deems it appropriate 
because exigent circumstances require such action.  Ideally, in an 
instance where Congress intends an appropriations bill to subsidize the 
military in times of peace, the president would be unable to exercise 
military force absent an authorization by Congress.56  This does not 
prevent the president from being able to invoke action in the name of 
exigent circumstances to exercise military force when slow action by 
Congress would make an emergency situation worse.57  The issue then 
becomes whether legislation restricting executive power such as the War 
Powers Resolution is an effective exercise of constitutional power.  This 
predicament necessitates the interpretation of the Constitution, and the 
inherent conflicts in the provisions supplying the president and 
Congress with their respective war power.  In this situation, the Supreme 
Court retains the authority to interpret the Constitution.58   
                                                 
54 ELY, supra note 48, at 123-25. 
55 War Power, supra note 49, at 1832. 
56 G. Sidney Buchanan, A Proposed Model for Determining the Validity of the Use of Force 
Against Foreign Adversaries Under the United States Constitution, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 379, 417 
(1992).  Buchanan argues that the president does not retain the constitutional power to use 
military force without the express authorization of Congress.  Id.  However, Richard 
Hartzman argues that the president does retain the power to act as Commander in Chief 
when participating in United Nations peace keeping operations.  See Richard Hartzman, 
Congressional Control of the Military in a Multilateral Context: A Constitutional Analysis of 
Congress’s Power to Restrict the President’s Authority to Place United States Armed Forces Under 
Foreign Commanders in United Nations Peace Operations, 162 MIL. L. REV. 50, 66 (1999). 
57 The Brig Army Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 692 (1862).  This case 
is referred to as The Prize Cases because it concerned the capture of four merchant ships 
during a blockade instituted by President Lincoln as part of his strategy to quell the 
rebellion of the Civil War.  Id.  The public ships of the United States captured the four ships 
as prizes, giving the case its pseudonym.  Id. at 635-37.  The Court concluded that in the 
event that the president must respond to an emergency, he may act with his full power as 
Commander in Chief of the military without the express authorization of Congress.  Id. at 
649. 
58 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 151-52 (1803). 
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However, the Court appears reluctant to become involved in 
disputes between the other two branches and uses the political question 
doctrine as a means to avoid reaching the merits of the disputes.   
C. The Political Question Doctrine 
Generally speaking, the Court invokes the political question doctrine 
when it deems a question of law inappropriate for judicial review 
because it should be resolved by the political process.59  In these 
situations, interpretation of the Constitution is left to the politically 
accountable branches of government.60  The Marbury v. Madison decision 
is the genesis of the doctrine.61  There, the Court declined to adjudicate 
whether they could award a writ of mandamus to James Madison 
because the appointment power is inherent to the executive power, and 
was not subject to judicial intervention under separation of powers 
concerns.62  In addition, the Supreme Court has used the political 
question doctrine when parties contest the validity of elections.   
                                                 
59 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 2.8.1, at 117 
(Aspen 1997). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. § 2.9, at 151-52.  While the Court fails to outright cite the doctrine of the separation 
of powers as part of the basis of their opinion, language used by the majority and the 
Court’s reliance on Federalist Nos. 78 and 79 demonstrate that the ability of the branches to 
operate independently of one another based on their enumerated powers is of paramount 
concern juxtaposed against the balance of powers.  Id. § 2.9, at 151.  For example, the Court 
states: 
The appointment of such an officer is complete when the President has 
nominated him to the senate, and the senate have advised and 
consented, and the President has signed the commission and delivered 
it to the secretary to be sealed.  The President has then done with it; it 
becomes irrevocable.  An appointment of a judge once completed, is 
made forever.  He holds under the constitution.  The requisites to be 
performed by the secretary are ministerial, ascertained by law, and he 
has no discretion, but must perform them; there is no dispensing 
power.  In contemplation of law they are as if done. 
Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 151 (1803)).  It is interesting that the 
Court points to Federalist Nos. 78 and 79 in its reasoning.  Federalist 78 focuses largely on the 
role of the judiciary in the balance of power, and at one point Hamilton explicitly states 
that the judiciary is an excellent prophylactic measure against despotism under a 
monarchy.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 472.  Hamilton 
also noted that the judiciary is, under the separation of the powers, the least dangerous 
branch of the proposed government.  Id. 
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Claims brought under the Guarantee Clause63 are consistently held 
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine64 because they 
typically involve challenges to the operation of republican government 
or the electoral process.  In Luther v. Borden,65 the Court refused to 
address the merits of the dispute because it would require review of a 
political question.66  Similarly, the Court refused to determine the 
outcome of the Kentucky gubernatorial race in 1900.67  However, the 
evolution of the doctrine demonstrates the Court has not applied it when 
mediating disputes between the other branches of government.   
In Baker v. Carr,68 the Court further defined the boundaries of the 
political question doctrine.69  Specifically, the Court concluded that the 
relevant considerations in determining if the doctrine applies are 
whether the dispute deals with the finality of judgments by other 
political branches and whether the dispute lacks sufficient criteria for 
judicial determination.70  The doctrine is typically relevant in situations 
where foreign relations,71 the duration of military action,72 the validity of 
the legislative process,73 or the status of Indian tribes74 is at issue.  In 
these situations, the doctrine exists to preserve political order by 
permitting sufficient respect for the role of the other arms of the 
                                                 
63 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.  The Guarantee Clause states that “The United States shall 
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect 
each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive 
(when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”  Id. 
64 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 2.8, at 122. 
65 48 U.S. 1 (1949). 
66 In Luther v. Borden, the Court considered whether the actions of police officials in 
Rhode Island in 1840 violated the Guarantee Clause by declaring elections under a new 
state constitution illegal.  Id.  The Court refused to deal with the issue under the political 
question doctrine because it would require the Court to declare the entire state government 
unconstitutional, thereby creating chaos.  Id. at 42-44.  Specifically, the Court stated that it 
was the duty of the legislature to determine what kind of government existed prior to the 
Court reviewing whether the existing government violated the Guarantee Clause.  Id.  
Creating the state government was a duty allocated to elected state officials and not an area 
subject to judicial review prior to its outset.  Id. at 45. 
67 Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900). 
68 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
69 See generally id. 
70 Id. at 210; see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939). 
71 Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 311 (1918). 
72 Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 57 (1923) (noting the specific power of 
declaration attributed to the Executive and Legislative branches); see also Hamilton v. Ky. 
Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 161 (1919) (explaining the breadth of the war 
power as including the remedies associated with military action and emergency situations). 
73 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 676-77 (1892). 
74 United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 419 (1865). 
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government.75  Ultimately, the doctrine is limited to cases where a 
government act is textually attributed to a political arm of the 
government, where the judiciary lacks a manageable method of 
resolving the issue, or when it is impossible for the Court to review the 
issue because another branch has not made a necessary policy decision 
that would give rise to a justiciable issue.76   
Baker v. Carr demonstrates that the purpose of the political question 
doctrine is to avoid conflicts between the power attributed to other 
branches and the judiciary, which it accomplishes by limiting the scope 
of judicial review.  However, in the context of the war powers, conflicts 
erupt between the legislative and executive branches because of their 
concurrent constitutional power.  The Court has rarely commented on 
the constitutionality of the president’s exercise of military force.77  The 
Brig Army Warwick, or the Prize Cases, is the primary authority in this 
area.78  The primary issue before the Court turned on whether President 
Lincoln was acting within his prescribed power when he authorized a 
naval blockade of southern states that resulted in the capture of several 
merchant vessels.79  In determining the distinction between the war 
power of Congress and the president, the Prize Cases Court noted that a 
state of war can exist without a formal congressional declaration.80  In 
addition, the Court determined that the president must act during a state 
of war notwithstanding the absence of a formal declaration of war from 
                                                 
75 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215 (1962). 
76 Id. at 217.  This definition of the doctrine comes from the oft-cited passage outlining 
the purpose and application of the political question doctrine, which states: 
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according 
to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political 
question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as 
essentially a function of the separation of powers.  Prominent on the 
surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question. 
Id. 
77 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 59, § 4.6.3, at 275. 
78 The Brig Army Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. 635 (1862). 
79 Id. at 641-42. 
80 Id. at 653-54. 
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Congress or the lack of legislative restrictions on the president’s exercise 
of military might.81  However, a law retroactively subsidizing military 
action and validating the president’s actions is inconsistent with the 
structure of the Constitution because only Congress can determine when 
a state of war exists.82   
Essentially, the Prize Cases articulate two circumstances where the 
president retains his power to wage war as Commander in Chief:  when 
Congress declares war, and when a state of war results from exigent 
circumstances.83  In determining whether the presidential powers of war 
activated under a legislative proclamation, the Court considered the 
context of the conflict including the way the president himself referred to 
the acts of the ceding states.84  Ultimately, the Court found that a state of 
war, by an international definition, did not exist rendering the seizure of 
the ships an invalid act under the Constitution.85  More specifically, the 
Constitution provides for definitions of war in the legal context, stating 
that only Congress may activate special presidential war powers because 
only congress may determine that a legal state of war exists.86   
This constitutional dichotomy, then, creates the kind of conflict Baker 
v. Carr aims to prevent the courts from hearing.  If Congress retains the 
sole authority to create laws granting the president the ability to use 
executive war powers, a presidential act inconsistent with an act of 
Congress falls squarely within the political arena.  But even with the 
Court’s reluctance to involve itself with conflicts arising from the 
political process, judicial attempts to refrain from becoming involved in 
conflicts over the war powers will likely become impossible when 
exercise of that power conflicts with civil liberties reserved by the Bill of 
Rights.  Current tensions regarding President Bush’s electronic 
surveillance program throw this problem into sharp relief.   
III.  WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE:  THE CURRENT PROBLEM 
In December 2005, The New York Times published a story detailing an 
initiative by President Bush permitting the National Security Agency 
(“NSA”) to eavesdrop on international telephone calls and e-mails of 
                                                 
81 Id. at 661-63. 
82 Id. at 649-50. 
83 Id. at 649. 
84 Id. at 642-43. 
85 Id. at 664. 
86 Id. at 649. 
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United States citizens.87  The purpose of gathering this intelligence88 is to 
attempt to recover information that might aid in preventing a terrorist 
attack.89  Regardless of its impetus, the program has raised constitutional 
questions and sparked litigation by the American Civil Liberties Union 
challenging the validity of the NSA’s program.90   
In 1972, in Keith,91 the United States Supreme Court invalidated the 
federal government’s approach to collecting intelligence under the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,92 which allowed the 
president to collect intelligence for national security purposes without a 
warrant.93  Congress responded by drafting the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (“FISA”) in 1978.94  FISA creates a system of classified 
courts that grant warrants allowing government surveillance activities 
for the purposes of national security.95  These warrants are actually 
orders obtained through ex parte application proceedings.96  However, 
                                                 
87 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 3, at A1. 
Under a presidential order signed in 2002, the intelligence agency has 
monitored the international telephone calls and international e-mail 
messages of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people inside the United 
States without warrants over the past three years in an effort to track 
possible “dirty numbers” linked to Al Qaeda, the officials said.  The 
agency, they said, still seeks warrants to monitor entirely domestic 
communications. 
Id. 
88 “Intelligence” is defined by the DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY 
AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02 (Apr. 12, 2001), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/, as amended from Aug. 15, 2005, in relevant 
part as follows: “1.  The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, 
analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign 
countries or areas.  2.  Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through 
observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.”  Id. at 264. 
89 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 3, at A1. 
The Bush administration views the operation as necessary so that the 
agency can move quickly to monitor communications that may 
disclose threats to the United States, the officials said.  Defenders of the 
program say it has been a critical tool in helping disrupt terrorist plots 
and prevent attacks inside the United States. 
Id. 
90 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E. D. Mich. 2006). 
91 United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
92 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3711-3797y-4 
(West 2003 & Supp. 2006). 
93 Keith, 407 U.S. 297. 
94 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1796 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1863 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006)). 
95 Douglas C. McNabb & Matthew R. McNabb, Of Bugs, the President, and the NSA: 
National Security Agency Intercepts Within the United States, CHAMPION, Mar. 2006, at 10-11. 
96 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1802, 1805 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006). 
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these warrant restrictions are not applicable in all cases because FISA 
permits a grace period of fifteen days when the president instigates 
foreign surveillance pursuant to a congressional declaration of war.97   
As a result, the constitutional question raised by the NSA program 
concerns its permissibility under the Fourth Amendment and the 
president’s war power.  In general, the Fourth Amendment protects 
citizens from government intrusion by preventing unreasonable search 
and seizure. 98  The warrant requirement provides the pragmatic 
protection of this right by rendering searches presumptively invalid 
without a proper warrant.99  Prior to the existence of FISA, the foreign 
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment allowed the 
government to avoid the warrant requirement.100  However, FISA 
changed this exception by legislatively requiring judicial review of 
searches in the name of foreign intelligence.101  Additionally, the Keith 
case had indicated that restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering are 
not as strict as those applied to domestic surveillance.102   
Currently, the president asserts that FISA does not apply to the NSA 
program because the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(“AUMF”)103 provides an exception to the application of FISA giving the 
president inherent authority to use all necessary force to pursue 
terrorists.104  President Bush also argues that FISA hinders the ability of 
the executive to wage the “War on Terror.”105  But his two reasons for 
ignoring FISA create a constitutional conflict.  The first reason questions 
the power of Congress to regulate the operation of the military within 
                                                 
97 Id. § 1811. 
98 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra note 30 (providing text of the Fourth Amendment). 
99 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Johnson 
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948). 
100 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); see also Arthur S. Lowry, Who’s 
Listening: Proposals for Amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 70 VA. L. REV. 297, 
299 (1984). 
101 In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 738 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002); see also United 
States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
102 Keith, 407 U.S. at 323. 
103 Authorization for Use of Military Force of September 18, 2001 (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 
107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
104 Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, to Pat Roberts, 
Chairman Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, John D. Rockefeller, IV, Vice Chairman 
Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, Peter Hoekstra, Chairman Permanent Select Comm. 
on Intelligence, and Jane Harman, Ranking Minority Member Permanent Select Comm. on 
Intelligence (Dec. 22, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Moschella Letter], available at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/pdf/12%2022%2005%20NSA%20letter.pdf. 
105 Milton Hirsch, A Letter to Congress, CHAMPION, Apr. 2006, at 50, 52-53. 
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the structural balance of power, while the second implicates the Fourth 
Amendment and existing limitations on the foreign intelligence 
exception to the warrant requirement.   
But the current dispute between the legislature and the president 
over the FISA structure focuses on whether the NSA domestic 
surveillance program is within the ambit of the FISA exceptions.106  The 
Department of Justice asserts that the AUMF constitutes an exception to 
the FISA requirements because it provides the president with unlimited 
authority to wage the “War on Terror.”107  If the AUMF does not 
supercede FISA, then the NSA program is governed by section 1811 of 
FISA and requires a declaration of war by Congress to validate the 
president’s actions if they exceed FISA’s fifteen-day grace period for 
wiretaps.   
This illustrates that, on one hand, Congress has issued a statute 
creating a structure of oversight dedicated to preventing the president 
from abusing his war power and protecting citizens’ Fourth Amendment 
rights.  On the other, the president continues to place wiretaps on 
American citizens under the auspices of national security.  Without 
judicial intervention, the legislative and executive branches will remain 
at an impasse.  To solve this dispute, the judiciary should decide the 
extent of legislative and executive power regardless of the political 
question doctrine.   
IV.  THE JUDICIARY SHOULD MEDIATE THE DISPUTE OVER THE WAR POWER 
The judiciary has the responsibility to interpret the language and 
structure of the Constitution to determine when government action is in 
violation of its various attributed powers.108  In a situation like the one 
presented with President Bush’s NSA electronic surveillance program, 
the judiciary must determine whether the executive has exceeded its 
constitutional authority.  Even though the Supreme Court has refused to 
address the scope of presidential power during times of war under the 
political question doctrine,109 the Court should review this situation 
                                                 
106 Section 1802 of FISA prefaces its application to “[n]otwithstanding any other law.”  50 
U.S.C.A. § 1802(a)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006).  Section 1811 of FISA states that the 
president is not obligated to obtain a FISA court order for fifteen days after the issuance of 
a declaration of war by Congress.  Id. 
107 Moschella Letter, supra note 104. 
108 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 59, at 36-37. 
109 See Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); Oetjen v. 
Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). 
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because its existing precedent demonstrates that the Court should 
mediate the dispute.  In addition, the Court’s constitutionally-mandated 
role in the operation of separate powers requires the Court’s 
involvement.   
A. The Legal Basis for Involving the Courts 
While the Supreme Court has generally taken a hands-off approach 
to decisions made in a time of war,110 the Court’s precedent 
demonstrates its willingness to limit the actions of the other branches 
under the doctrine of separate powers to preserve the liberty rights of 
the citizenry.   
First, the Court’s decision in the Prize Cases shows that it should 
mediate the dispute surrounding the NSA surveillance program.  The 
Court established that when the president exercises his authority to use 
military force and Congress does not act to rein in the exercise of that 
power, the federal courts should not involve themselves with subsequent 
disputes about the presidential exercise.111  While superficially this 
appears to resolve the point of justiciability under the political question 
doctrine and the separation of powers, the conflict presented with the 
NSA program fundamentally differs from the situation presented in the 
Prize Cases.  Specifically, the Prize Cases demonstrate that the president 
only retains the power to use military force where Congress has failed to 
restrict his ability to act.  FISA and the War Powers Resolution operate to 
fill the void created by the Prize Cases:  since their adoption, the 
president no longer retains unilateral discretion to commit the military to 
action.  As a result, the Prize Cases, FISA, and the War Powers 
Resolution work in concert to limit the executive war power.   
In particular, FISA and the War Powers Resolution restrict the 
exercise of the president’s power in several ways.  The purpose of the 
War Powers Resolution112 is to insure that full consideration by both 
Congress and the president contributes to any decision that would put 
American military forces into action.113  The Resolution places specific 
                                                 
110 See Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. at 111; Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302. 
111 The Brig Army Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 649 (1862). 
112 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1541-1548 (West 2003). 
113 Id. § 1541(a).  Section 1541 articulates the purpose of the War Powers Resolution 
indicating that it operates to 
fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States 
and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the 
President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces 
into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in 
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limitations on the president’s power to act as Commander in Chief114 and 
requires that the president involve Congress in decisions regarding on-
going military activity.115  Similarly, FISA restricts the president’s ability 
to collect information from citizens by requiring that wire taps satisfy the 
Fourth Amendment.116  Under these statutes, Congress has taken explicit 
steps to control the boundaries of the president’s war power.  In the 
Prize Cases, the Court determined that it lacks the power to render a 
decision in cases where the president exercises his war power when 
Congress has failed to restrict his power, demonstrating that the 
Supreme Court should mediate disputes in the area of the war power 
when called upon to do so. 117  However, the Court’s decision in the Steel 
Seizure case demonstrates that justiciability in a dispute between the 
legislative and executive branches requires more than an act of Congress 
restricting the president’s power.118   
In the Steel Seizure case, the Supreme Court determined that the 
president lacked constitutional authority to seize control of the nation’s 
steel mills to ensure continued steel production during World War II.119  
In analyzing the breadth of presidential authority under the war power, 
the Court determined that any exercise of this authority must stem either 
from an act of Congress or the Constitution.120  Justice Jackson’s 
concurrence elaborated on this analysis by stating three classifications 
for determining presidential authority.121  The first classification 
provides the president with the most authority because he acts with the 
permission of Congress, buttressing the president’s own constitutional 
powers with all the authority Congress can delegate.122  The second 
classification contemplates situations where the legislative and executive 
branches share power, but Congress has failed to act.123  In this 
                                                                                                             
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the 
continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations. 
Id. 
114 Id. § 1541(c).  In this subsection, congress relegates the president’s power to act as 
Commander in Chief to only exist where there is “(1) a declaration of war, (2) specific 
statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United 
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”  Id. 
115 Id. § 1542. 
116 50 U.S.C.  §§ 1801-1863 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006). 
117 The Brig Army Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 649 (1862). 
118 See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 
(1952). 
119 Id. at 588. 
120 Id. at 586. 
121 Id. at 636-39. 
122 Id. at 636-37. 
123 Id. at 637. 
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classification, the president has independent authority.124  The final 
classification illustrates that the president’s power is at its lowest when 
he acts contrary to an act of Congress.125   
Justice Jackson’s concurrence takes into account the division of 
power articulated in the Constitution.  With regards to the war powers, 
the Court has concluded that only Congress can determine when a state 
of war exists and thereby activate the full breadth of the president’s 
power to act as Commander in Chief.126  In the current conflict over the 
“War on Terror,” acts of Congress like FISA, the War Powers 
Resolution,127 and the AUMF128 arguably activate President Bush’s 
ability to act as Commander in Chief.  If this is the case, the Steel Seizure 
decision would require the courts to defer their judgments in favor of the 
president.129  Conversely, if FISA, the War Powers Resolution, and the 
AUMF serve to restrict executive military abilities, then presidential 
power is at its lowest because programs like the NSA electronic 
surveillance program operate contrary to acts of Congress.130   
The president would likely argue that the NSA electronic 
surveillance program falls within the first classification because the 
executive receives the most deference from the judiciary.131  Under this 
analysis, the president would retain the power to authorize the NSA 
surveillance program and could wage the war on terror in any manner 
consistent with the congressional grant of power.  Alternatively, the 
program could fall into the third classification, which is the least 
deferential to presidential action.132  If the NSA program falls within the 
ambit of FISA, then the Court must determine in which classification the 
                                                 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 637-38. 
126 See The Brig Army Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 664 (1862). 
127 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1796 
(1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1863 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006)); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 51-55.  It is important to point out that statutes like the War 
Powers Resolution and FISA originally intended to limit the ability of the president to 
utilize all the tools available at his disposal without congressional or administrative 
oversight. 
128 See supra note 103.  The AUMF, on the other hand, operates as an express grant of 
power to pursue the war on terror.  When the president exercises his military power under 
the AUMF in opposition to the restrictions imposed by FISA and the War Powers 
Resolution a conflict arises between these three laws.  The resulting dispute can only be 
resolved by applying the standards espoused in the Steel Seizure case and the Prize Cases. 
129 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 636-37. 
130 Id. at 637-38. 
131 See id. at 636-37. 
132 Id. at 637-38. 
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program belongs and the degree of deference that the Court must show 
to the president’s actions.  Based on the Prize Cases and the Steel Seizure 
decisions, determining the justiciability of a dispute between Congress 
and the president requires determining the degree to which each branch 
has exerted its constitutional authority.  Determining which classification 
applies should assist in deciding whether the political question doctrine 
applies.   
More specifically, if the first classification applies then the Court 
should not get involved because the president is acting with the full 
extent of his constitutional power.  However, if the Court determines 
that the president’s action falls into the third classification, then his 
action receives the least amount of judicial deference.  In such a situation, 
the Court should not be bound by the political question doctrine because 
the issue would be the constitutionality of the president’s actions where 
Congress retains the sole authority to act.  The operation of the separate 
powers requires the Court to keep the president and Congress within the 
ambit of their constitutional powers.  However, it is possible that the 
political question doctrine supercedes the concerns raised by the Prize 
Cases and Steel Seizure.  Even so, the Court should still consider the 
merits of a dispute over the war power because it implicates a 
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Bill of Rights.   
B. The Court Should Review the NSA Program Because It Implicates a 
Fundamental Liberty Interest 
In United States v. Nixon,133 the Court considered whether President 
Nixon’s tape-recorded conversations in the oval office during the 
Watergate scandal were subject to an executive privilege.134  However, 
before the Court could reach the merits of the case, it had to determine 
whether the issue was a nonjusticiable political question.  In concluding 
that the Court could decide the dispute, it noted that determining 
justiciability is an inquiry that goes beyond the status of the parties; the 
Court must look to the underlying issue in order to determine whether 
the case is cognizable.135  The Court found that the issue typically arises 
in the regular course of criminal prosecution, which is within the 
traditional scope of judicial review.136  After making a determination of 
justiciability, the Court found that the executive office lacked a 
discernable privilege under the responsibilities enumerated in Article II 
                                                 
133 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 693. 
136 Id. at 697. 
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of the Constitution because the existence of an absolute executive 
privilege requires more than support from the doctrine of separate 
powers and the need for confidentiality in communications at high 
levels.137  Absent a need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive 
national security secrets, the Court declined to find a sufficient 
confidentiality interest to support the executive privilege asserted by 
Nixon in the Watergate investigation.138   
Nixon demonstrates the role of the separation of powers in the 
political question doctrine, but the opinion also highlights that the norm 
of separation of powers has priority over the political question 
doctrine.139  Separation of powers requires the Court to interpret the 
enumerated powers in a way that demonstrates their separation but also 
their balance.140  In Nixon, it was the Court’s concern for preserving the 
constitutional balance that operates to preserve a workable government 
structure.141   
In addition, the Court has reviewed other cases on a very limited 
basis when a superceding policy is at issue.  In particular, the Court has 
exercised its judicial power of review over political questions in cases 
that typically incorporate constitutional principles that transcend the 
operation of the political scheme.  In United States v. Nixon, the Court 
acted to prevent the crippling effect on the exercise of judicial power that 
would follow from the creation of an executive privilege.142   
Similarly, the Court has acted to protect individual liberties 
notwithstanding the political question doctrine in Nixon v. Herndon.143  
The Court in Herndon considered a racial discrimination policy regarding 
voting in the Texas Democratic primary.144  The political question 
doctrine did not protect the actions of the Texas legislature from judicial 
                                                 
137 Id. at 705-06. 
138 Id. at 706. 
139 Id. at 706-07. 
140 Id. at 707; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
141 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635.  The majority’s opinion in Nixon and Justice Jackson’s 
concurrence in Steel Seizure are consistent with James Madison’s position in Federalist No. 48 
when he noted the impracticability of strict adherence to the separation of powers.  THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 300.  United States v. Nixon points out 
an interesting example, noting the ineffectiveness of judicial determinations in a situation 
where the president may assert a privilege that would prevent the Court from performing 
its constitutional duty.  418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974). 
142 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707. 
143 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
144 Id. at 539. 
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review because the legislation refused a citizen the right to vote.145  The 
Court determined that this  refusal created a private right of action for 
the plaintiff, and that relegating the claim nonjusticiable pursuant to the 
political question doctrine would be a mere play on words because the 
action itself involved the exercise of the political process.146   
More recently, the Court used similar considerations on facts that 
specifically operated within the political sphere.  In Bush v. Gore,147 the 
plurality used the fundamental constitutional interest in voting rights to 
avoid the conflict posed by the political question doctrine.148  
Interestingly, the Court justified rendering a decision based on having 
the “responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues the 
judicial system has been forced to confront.”149  In its reasoning, the 
Court purposely subordinated political question concerns.150  Similarly, 
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court acted under the guise of due process 
rights to justify its involvement and subsequently limitation of the 
president’s power to wage war.151   
In the dispute between Congress and President Bush over the NSA 
domestic surveillance program, the political question doctrine is a viable 
option that would allow the Court to avoid determining who retains 
constitutional authority.  But, the Court should not use the political 
question doctrine to avoid rendering a decision if the case is brought 
before the federal courts.  Prior Supreme Court decisions, such as Nixon 
                                                 
145 Id. at 540. 
146 Id.  The Court has reaffirmed this position.  See generally Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 
(1932). 
147 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
148 Id. at 98-112.  Practically, the Court’s decision leveled the playing field of voter rights 
by making the value of each vote equal in general elections.  The Court rendered its 
decision over the objections of other members of the Court under the political question 
doctrine.  Id. at 142-43.  Per Nixon v. Herndon, though, it is clear that the political question 
doctrine does not apply to situations where voting rights are involved.  273 U.S. 536 (1927).  
The per curiam decision was built largely on the foundation of one-person, one-vote.  Gore, 
531 U.S. at 108. 
149 Gore, 531 U.S. at 111.  However, some commentators posit that the situation was not 
cognizable by the Court on grounds of justiciability.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore was 
not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093 (2001).  Professor Chemerinsky argues that the 
political question doctrine would have solved the problem by leaving the election to the 
operation of the political process.  Id. 
150 Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court?  The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine 
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 242-43 (2002). 
151 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516, 536-40 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 475-
85 (2004).  Parts of these decisions operate to limit presidential power by invalidating 
President Bush’s attempt to indefinitely detain prisoners because only Congress retains the 
ability to suspend the process of habeas corpus.  See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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v. Herndon,152 Bush v. Gore,153 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,154 and Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld,155 demonstrate that if a sufficient liberty interest or a 
constitutional right is at risk, the Court might become involved and 
resolve the dispute.  The war power and the NSA program raise Fourth 
Amendment concerns because NSA wiretaps constitute a search under 
the Fourth Amendment.  This interest is sufficiently important for the 
Court to approach the merits of the dispute between the legislative and 
executive offices.  Currently, President Bush’s position states that the 
NSA program is within the confines of the FISA structure because 
Congress authorized the use of force to pursue the “War on Terror.”156  
FISA contemplates restricting the operation of government wiretaps on 
international communications157 that involve communications by non-
citizens.158  However, this implicates the right of individuals to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure.   
In particular, the NSA program necessarily captures 
communications where an American citizen is involved because it 
targets international telephone and electronic mail communications 
originating in the United States.159  This places the NSA program 
completely outside the purview of FISA and squarely within the realm of 
the Fourth Amendment.  Absent a national security or foreign 
intelligence exception to the warrant requirement, the president would 
have to obtain warrants for every domestic wiretap.160  But the Supreme 
                                                 
152 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
153 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
154 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
155 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).  The Court refused to permit President Bush’s plan for trying 
suspected terrorists in the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, because the plan 
violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Convention.  Id. at 2786-93, 
2795. 
156 AUMF, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).  Congress instructed the president “to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States . . . .”  Id.  
Congress’s grant of “all necessary and appropriate force” to pursue this task precedes this 
language in the statute.  Id.  To determine whether the president acted within his 
constitutional authority, the Court must confront whether this authorization supercedes 
FISA though it explicitly states it does not supercede any part of the War Powers 
Resolution. 
157 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802(a)(1)(A) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006). 
158 Id. § 1802(a)(1)(B). 
159 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 3, at 1; see also Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. 
Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
160 United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).  Keith established 
that, regardless of its impetus, domestic surveillance requires satisfaction of the warrant 
requirement by a neutral magistrate under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 316-17.  This case 
fundamentally denies the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement where the 
targets of government surveillance are United States citizens. 
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Court foreclosed the existence of a national security exception to the 
warrant requirement in the Keith case.161  As a result, the NSA program 
causes an inherent conflict between all three branches because the Fourth 
Amendment requires a neutral fact-finder to issue search warrants.162  
The doctrine of separation of powers dictates that the courts fill the role 
of neutral arbiter in the criminal process where the Executive branch is 
not neutral and disinterested when, through the Attorney General, it acts 
as investigator and prosecutor.163  These actions fundamentally erode the 
validity of the criminal process.  Similarly, FISA represents the bare 
minimum of judicial protection under the Fourth Amendment.164  
President Bush’s refusal to cooperate with the restrictions set in place by 
FISA adds to the conflict because the president ignores laws created 
pursuant to the constitutional authority retained by Congress.   
If cases like ACLU v. NSA reach the Supreme Court, the Court must 
act to prevent the negative impact on liberty caused by programs with 
presidential authorization like the one operated by the NSA.  In his 
dissent in Olmstead v. United States,165 Justice Brandeis explained that 
“[t]he greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men 
of zeal.”166  Moreover, Brandeis explained that the government breeds 
contempt for the law by breaking it, thereby inviting anarchy.167  The 
NSA program stands to create anarchy if it continues to collect data 
without adhering to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  
When the government breaks the law, citizens lose trust in its operation 
and refuse to adhere to it.168  The Fourth Amendment protects a person’s 
right to a reasonable expectation of privacy.169  Additionally, the Court 
                                                 
161 Id.  The Court pointed out specifically, “These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot 
properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within 
the discretion of the Executive Branch.”  Id. at 316-17. 
162 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
163 Barbara E. Bergman, When the Government Breaks the Law, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 
45. 
164 Id. 
165 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
166 Id. at 479.  The Court found that the Fourth Amendment did not prevent the use of 
information gained through telephone wiretaps without a warrant.  Id. at 467-69.  This case 
was subsequently overruled in part by Katz, 389 U.S. 347, and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 
41 (1967).  Justice Brandeis’s dissent articulates the dangers in permitting violations of the 
Fourth Amendment, noting the importance of the privacy protected by the warrant 
requirement, and the damaging effect on liberty resulting from diminished restrictions on 
the ability of the government to intrude in the lives of the citizenry.  Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 
474-76. 
167 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478. 
168 Id. 
169 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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has stated that the security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by 
the police is the core of the Fourth Amendment and basic to a free 
society.170  This concept is implicit in ordered liberty.171  Permitting 
President Bush’s surveillance program to avoid the prohibitions of the 
Fourth Amendment would allow the arbitrary invasion of privacy, 
weakening the value of liberty in the Constitution as a result. 
The evolution of the law surrounding the political question doctrine 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court has found cases justiciable when 
government action, either executive or legislative, implicates a 
fundamental liberty interest.  The NSA program violates the Fourth 
Amendment, implicating a fundamental right protecting American 
citizens from the abuse of government power.  The Court must step in to 
establish the boundaries of legislative and executive power to protect 
this right. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The constitutional division of the war power between the executive 
and legislative branches can cause an inherent conflict when one branch 
exercises its power in opposition of the other.  While the Supreme Court 
would typically find such a conflict nonjusticiable under the political 
question doctrine, the Court should find these disputes cognizable if the 
president oversteps the breadth of his constitutional authority impeding 
upon the power attributed to another branch, or if it implicates a 
fundamental liberty interest retained by American citizens. 
President Bush’s domestic surveillance program, conflicts with acts 
of Congress such as FISA and the War Powers Resolution.  These acts 
aim to rein in the president’s power to wage war, but the NSA program 
seemingly disregards these restrictions.  The program contradicts the 
power of Congress.  As a result, the Supreme Court must mediate the 
dispute between Congress and the president because the executive has 
invaded the constitutional authority retained by Congress. 
Moreover, the NSA program collects the personal information of the 
citizenry without a warrant, and the Fourth Amendment requires the 
government to obtain a warrant in order to collect this information.  
Because the Supreme Court has failed to recognize a national security 
exception to the warrant requirement, the NSA program violates the 
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourth Amendment.  In 
                                                 
170 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). 
171 Id. 
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order to prevent the harm to liberty that could lead towards anarchy, the 
Supreme Court must determine the breadth of the president’s 
constitutional power to exercise military force under the auspice of 
national security. 
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